Married women's labor force participation increased dramatically over the last century. Why this occurred has been the subject of much debate. This paper investigates the role of changes in culture arising from learning in generating this increase. To do so, it develops a dynamic model of culture in which individuals hold heterogeneous beliefs regarding the relative long-run payo¤s for women who work in the market versus the home. These beliefs evolve rationally via an intergenerational learning process. Women are assumed to learn about the long-term payo¤s of working by observing (noisy) private and public signals. This process generically generates an S-shaped …gure for female labor force participation, which is what is found in the data. The S shape results from the dynamics of learning. I calibrate the model to several key statistics and show that it does a good job in replicating the quantitative evolution of female LFP in the US over the last 120 years. The model highlights a new dynamic role for changes in wages via their e¤ect on intergenerational learning. The calibration shows that this role was quantitatively important in several decades.
Introduction
A fundamental change over the last century has been the vast increase in female labor force participation. In particular, married women's participation in the formal labor market increased dramatically-from around 2% in 1880 to over 70% in 2000-though the pace of change was markedly uneven. As shown in …gure 1, married women's labor force participation increased very slowly from 1880 to 1920, grew a bit more rapidly between 1920 and 1950, then accelerated between 1950 and 1990, and has since stayed relatively constant. 1 Many explanations have been given for this transformation. Depending on the particular time period under consideration, potential causal factors have included structural change in the economy (the rise of the clerical sector), technological change in the workplace and in the household, medical advances (including the introduction and dissemination of the oral contraceptive), decreases in discrimination, institutional changes in divorce law, and the greater availability of childcare. 2 A popular alternative explanation (though not with economists) is that changes in culture or social norms have exerted great in ‡uence on the evolution of women's role in the market work. 3 And, from multiple sources of evidence, it certainly appears that opinions about the role of women in the workplace have changed radically over time. Figure 2,  for example, shows the evolution of the percentage of the population that answered a¢ rmatively to the question "Do you approve of a married woman earning money in business or industry if she has a husband capable of supporting her?" 4 In 1936 fewer than 20% of individuals sampled agreed with the statement; in 1998 fewer than 20% of individuals disagreed with it. 5 Merely pointing to the fact that society has changed the way in which it regards women, however, is not particularly enlightening. It begs the question as to why culture changed and 1 These LFP numbers were calculated by the author from the US Census for white, married women between the ages of 25-44, born in the US, not in agriculture, non-farm, non-institutional quarters. 2 The classic source for an economic history of female labor force participation is Goldin (1990) . For various explanations for this change see, among others, Goldin (1990) , Galor and Weil (1996) , Costa (2000) , Goldin and Katz (2002) , Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003) , Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005) , Gayle and Golan (2006) , Olivetti (2006, 2007) , and Knowles (2007) . 3 The reluctance of economists to believe in cultural explanations stems, in large part, from the absence of empirical evidence that convincingly isolates cultural in ‡uences from their economic and institutional environment. There has been recent progress in this area, however (see Fernández (2007a) and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006) for partial reviews of this literature). For example, Fernández and Fogli (2005) show that the variation in the work behavior of second-generation American women can be explained, in part, by the level of female LFP in their parents'country of origin (see also Antecol (2000) ). Moreover, Fernández (2007b) shows that the attitudes towards women's work in the parental country of origin has important explanatory value for second-generation American women's work behavior in the US (see also Burda, Hamermesh, and Weil (2007) who show that these attitudes help explain married men and women's work decisions inside and outside the home). These papers show that cultural di¤erences across societies matter for women's work decisions, but they are silent on the evolution of culture. Fernández, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004) give an indication for one way that culture may evolve over time by showing that working mothers seem to transmit a di¤erent set of beliefs or preferences to their sons, which then makes it more attractive for the wives of these men to work (relative to the wives of men whose mothers did not work). 4 The exact wording of this question varied a bit over time. See The Gallup Poll; public opinion, 1935-1971. 5 For additional evidence that individual attitudes and work behavior are correlated see, for example, Levine (1993) , Vella (1994) , Fortin (2005) , and Farré-Olalla and Vella (2007 why these changes a¤ected work behavior in such a gradual and uneven fashion. Indeed, one might be tempted, as surely some are, to dismiss the evolution of beliefs as mere changes in the superstructure of the economy that simply accompany and re ‡ect the changes in material conditions brought about by technological change. 6 Viewed from this perspective, as technological advances altered women's work behavior, beliefs simply marched right along in step and changed with them. An alternative view of culture often provided in economic theory-that of a selection mechanism among multiple equilibria-likewise does not provide a very useful framework in which to think about questions of cultural change. Without a more developed theory of why culture changes, one is left with either sunspots causing a switch among equilibria or an evolutionary theory of gradual changes over time. 7 Taking inspiration from the fact that women's labor force participation changed in a very uneven fashion over time in a form that resembles an "S-shape", this paper explores the idea that in some contexts it may be useful to think about cultural change as the evolution of beliefs that occurs over time as part of a rational, intergenerational learning process. 8 6 See, e.g., Guner and Greenwood (2006) who argue that the change in sexual mores re ‡ect changes in the e¢ cacy of contraception. 7 For an interesting example of evolutionary theory applied to culture see Bowles (1998) . Alternatively, social norms can be passed on from parents to children in an optimizing fashion as in Bisin and Verdier (2000) and Tabellini (2007) . 8 The idea that cultural change may be modelled as a learning process is already present in the seminal paper of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), though the focus there is on information cascades in which individuals stop learning. In particular, the S-shaped curve of female labor force dynamics is reminiscent of similarly shaped curves that are common in the process of technology adoption and may constitute an important clue that a similar mechanism of information di¤usion is also at play in this context, though on a very di¤erent time scale. 9 Where might learning play a role in the transformation of women's work? It is not an exaggeration to state that, throughout the last century, women's work has been a subject of great contention. As industrialization and urbanization progressed over time, so did specialization. Younger men and (unmarried) women were drawn into the paid workplace and away from sharing household chores, and the spheres of work and home became increasingly separate. This process left the wife in charge of the domestic realm and her husband in charge of supporting the family, and kicked o¤ a debate on the e¤ect of a wife working (outside the home) on her family and marriage as well as on her psyche and image (and on those of her husband's) that continues, in di¤erent guises, to this day. 10 For example, as noted by Goldin (1990) , at the turn of the 20th century most working women were employed as domestic servants or in manufacturing. In this environment, a married woman's employment signalled that her husband was unable to provide adequately for his 9 There is a large literature on learning and technology adoption. See, for example, Griliches (1957) , Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) , Conley and Udry (2003) , Munshi (2004) , Munshi and Myaux (2006) , and Bandiera and Rasul (2006 problems became headline news all over the US. Thus, throughout the last century the expected payo¤ to a woman working has been the subject of an evolving debate.
In this paper I develop a simple model of women's work decisions in which beliefs about the (long-run) payo¤ to working evolve endogenously over time. 13;14 Using a framework broadly similar to Vives (1993) and Chamley (1999) , I assume that women possess a private signal about how costly it is to work (e.g., how negative the outcome is for a woman's marriage, children, etc.) and that they also observe a noisy public signal indicatory of past beliefs concerning this value. This signal is a simple linear function of the proportion of women who worked in the previous generation and is equivalent to observing a noisy signal of the average utility of working women in the past. Women use this information to update their prior beliefs and then make a decision whether to work. In the following period, the next generation once again observes a noisy public signal generated by the decisions of women in the preceding generation, each woman obtains her individual private signal (or equivalently inherits that of her mother's), and makes her work decision. Thus, beliefs evolve endogenously via a process of intergenerational learning.
The model described above generically generates an S-shaped …gure for female labor force participation. The S shape results from the dynamics of learning. When very few women participate in the labor market (as a result of initial priors that are pessimistic about the payo¤ from working), learning is very slow since the noisiness of the signal swamps the information content given by small di¤erences in the proportion of women who would work in di¤erent states of the world. As the proportion of women who work increases and beliefs 1 1 Over 80% of married women, not employed in 1939 but had worked at some point prior to marriage, exited the workplace at the precise time of marriage. These numbers are cited in Goldin (1990, p. 34) 1 3 Whether preferences or beliefs changed is often impossible to distinguish and, in a reduced-form setup, it is also unnecessary. The assumption that changes in beliefs were driven by learning is important, however, as Bayesian updating thus constrains the path taken by beliefs. An additional advantage of this modelling choice is that is straightforward to think about social welfare, which is not the case if preferences themselves are a¤ected (see Fernández (2007a) for a discussion of these issues). 1 4 A recent paper by Fogli and Veldkamp (2007) independently develops a related idea. They study the labor force participation of women with children from 1940-2000 and assume that women learn about the ability cost to a child from having a working mother. Learning occurs through sampling the ability outcomes of a small number of other women. Whereas in my model actions change because people modify their beliefs about the cost of working, in their model beliefs change only because of a reduction of uncertainty about the cost. Also related is Munshi and Myaux (2006) who model the change in contraceptive practice in rural Bangladesh as learning about the the preferences of individuals in one's social network. They too use a sampling model but there is, in addition, a strategic aspect to individual choices since an agent's payo¤ depends on the contraceptive choices of the other individual sampled. Lastly, Mira (2005) examines the links between fertility and infant mortality in a model which mothers are learning about a family-speci…c component of infant mortality risk.
about work become more positive, the information content in the signal improves. Once a large enough proportion of women work though, once again, the informational content in the public signal falls since the di¤erences in the proportion of women who would work under di¤erent states of the world is small and thus swamped by the noise.
The model also introduces a new role for changes in wages or technological change, which to my knowledge has not been noted in the learning literature. Unlike in traditional models, increases in women's wages or new technologies that make it easier for women to work outside the home, have not only a static e¤ect of making work more attractive and thereby increasing female LFP, but they also have a dynamic e¤ect since they a¤ect the informativeness of the public signal and hence the degree of intergenerational updating of beliefs. 15 In particular, when the average woman is pessimistic about the payo¤ to women's work, increasing the attractiveness of work improves the informativeness of the public signal by moderating the private signal that she requires in order to be willing to work. 2 A Simple Model of a Woman' s Work Decision I start with a very simple model of a woman's work decision that depends on the two main variables that are typically assumed to play a role, namely her consumption possibilities as a function of her decision and her disutility from working. As I am interested in the di¤erence in the long-run payo¤s from working versus not working, the disutility from working should be viewed as arising not only from labor-leisure preferences, but also from what might happen to a woman's identity, marriage, or her children as a result of her decision. In this …rst model, I assume that the di¤erence in disutility is known and constant. What is critical though is that its expected value does not evolve endogenously over time; whether it is known for sure is otherwise irrelevant.
A woman makes her work decision to maximize: 16
where 0 and 1 is an indicator function that takes the value one if she works and zero otherwise. A woman's consumption is the sum of her earnings, w f , (which are positive only if she works) and her husband's earnings, w h . Husbands are assumed to always work, i.e.,
The disutility of work, v i , is assumed to consist of two parts,
where the …rst component is common to all women and the second component is idiosyncratic and normally distributed, l N (0; 2 l ). Clearly, a woman will work i¤
and thus, assuming that there is a continuum of agents of mass one in each period, the aggregate number and proportion of women who work at time t is given by
where G( ) is the cdf of the l distribution and l t is the value of l such that (4) is a strict equality.
Note that in this simple model, the dynamics of female labor force participation is determined entirely by the dynamics of earnings. As earnings evolve, so does l . In particular, women's LFP is increasing in their own earnings, i.e., @l @w f > 0, whereas it is decreasing in their husbands'earnings, @l @w h < 0. 1 6 We consider only the extensive margin, i.e., she either works or not.
6
We next incorporate beliefs and learning in the simple model above. Women are assumed to be uncertain about the common value of the disutility of labor, ; e.g., they are unsure how bad working will be for their marriage, children, identity, etc. This is not something that can be learned by entering the labor market for a short period of time nor by experimentation, but rather reveals its e¤ects over a lifetime.
For simplicity, we assume that can take on only two values, high (H) and low (L),
i.e., 2 f H ; L g. 17 Note that L is the good state of nature in which working is not so costly, i.e., H > L 0. An individual woman now makes her work decision to maximize her expected utility, i.e., equation (1) is modi…ed to re ‡ect uncertainty about the payo¤ to working:
where E is the expectations operator and
The model incorporates two sources of learning. One is a private signal regarding the true value of , . The second is a public intergenerational signal of the decisions taken by women in the preceding generation. It is the latter social source of learning that is key.
The exact mechanics are made more precise below.
Consider a woman in period t who has a prior belief about as summarized in the log likelihood ratio (LLR) t = ln P r( = L ) P r( = H ) . Prior to making her work decision, she receives a private signal s it regarding . This signal can be thought of as arising from many sources (e.g., the scienti…c literature that existed at that time regarding the e¤ect of a woman working) and can be either newly generated each period or inherited from the woman's mother. 18 The private signal is given by:
where N (0; 2 ) and its cumulative and probability distribution functions are denoted by F ( ; ) and f ( ; ), respectively. 19 The private signals are assumed to be iid across women.
After receiving (or inheriting) her private signal, s, each woman i updates her prior belief accordingly using Bayes'rule, resulting in a new LLR, it (s), given by 1 7 Alternatively, one can think of individuals obtaining an ex-post realization i of a random variable with a mean equal to either H or L . Individuals would thus be learning about the true mean over time (hence even if one were able to observe an individual realization of , it would convey little information about the bene…ts of working). 1 8 In the calibration of the model we use the latter interpretation. 1 9 The results do not depend on " being normally distributed. Rather, as will be made clear further on, one requires a cdf that changes slowly, then rapidly, and lastly slowly again. where = ( L + H )=2. 20 Note that @ it (s) @s < 0 since observing higher values of s increases the likelihood that the true value of is H . Note also that the revision of is decreasing with the variance of the noise term, 2 2 , since it lowers the informativeness of the signal. Assume that women have a common prior in period t, t . 21 What proportion of women will choose to work that period? A woman will work in period t i¤
that is, the expected net bene…t from working must exceed the idiosyncratic disutility of work. For notational ease, we henceforth denote the di¤erence in consumption utility
by W (w ht ; w f t ). Note …rst that given f H ; L g and earnings (w ht ; w f t ), irrespective of their beliefs and thus of the signal they receive, women with very low l's (l l(w ht ; w f t )) will always work and women with very high l's (l l(w ht ; w f t )) will never work, where
Next, for each women of type l j , l < l j < l, one can solve for the critical value of the private signal s j ( ) such that, for any s s j , given her prior belief , she would be willing to work. Let p = P r( = L ) and let p j be the critical probability such that a woman of type l j is indi¤erent between working and not, i.e.,
Using (10), we obtain p j (w ht ; w f t ) =
and hence,
Thus, the critical value, s j , of the private signal a woman of type l j must receive in order to work, given a prior of t , is given by
and hence
We can conclude from the derivation above that the proportion of women of type l j , 2 0 To obtain (8) one uses the fact that P r(sj ) is equal to the probability of observing a signal s generated by a normal distribution N ( ; 2 ): 2 1 The structure of the model will ensure that this is the case. l < l j < l, that will work in time t given a prior of t and a true state of nature , ! jt ( ; t ), is the proportion of this type that receives signals lower than s j ( t ), i.e.,
Thus, the total proportion of women that will work in period t is given by:
where g ( ) is the pdf of the l distribution G ( ). Note that, as in the prior model,
Intergenerational Transmission
What information is passed on from generation t to generation t + 1? I assume that each woman passes on to her child her prior, it (s). Equivalently, generation t + 1 inherits the prior of generation t (its "culture"), t , which each individual then updates with her private signal (which can be assumed to be either inherited from her mother or the result of a new random draw s). If solely this information was transmitted intergenerationally, then the learning model would behave in the same way as the earnings only model since this implies it (s) = it+1 (s); the only change in work behavior over time would result from changes in wages. There is, however, an additional source of information available to women in t + 1 that was not available to women at time t -the proportion of women who worked in period t:
If generation t+1 were able to observe perfectly the aggregate proportion of women who worked in period t, ! t , they would be able to back out the true state of nature, , as a result of the law of large numbers (i.e., using equation (16)). While assuming that information about how many women worked in the past is totally unavailable seems extreme, the notion that this knowledge is completely informative seems equally implausible and is merely an artifact of the simplicity of the model. I employ therefore the conventional tactic in this literature and assume that women are able to observe a noisy function of the aggregate proportion of women worked. 22 In particular, I assume that women observe a noisy signal of ! t , y t , where
and where t N (0; 2 ) with a pdf denoted by h( ; ). 23 Thus, given a common inherited 2 2 An alternative assumption, pursued in Fernández and Potamites (2007) , is that agents know the work behavior of a small number of other women in their social circle (as in Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) ). This yields similar results. It has the advantage, for the calibration, of not requiring a speci…cation of an aggregate shock but the disadvantage of being sensitive to assumptions about the size of a woman's social group. Amador and Weill (2006) also obtain an S shape in the behavior of aggregate investment by assuming that agents observe a noisy private signal of other's actions as well as a noisy public signal of aggregate behavior. They are interested in the welfare properties of the two sources of information. 2 3 The assumption that is distributed normally implies, as usual, that some observations of yt will be implies an updated common belief for generation t + 1 of:
Note that (18) is the law of motion of aggregate beliefs (culture) for the economy.
One way to think about the above assumption is that it is a shorthand for agents knowing the proportion of women who worked but uncertain about the distribution of married men and women's incomes. Alternatively, one could assume that individuals perfectly observe LFP, but are uncertain about the distribution of an idiosyncratic utility factor a¤ecting the disutility of work. The value of some parameter in the distribution of the idiosyncratic utility factor would change randomly every period (e.g. by depending on an unobservable aggregate factor in the economy). 24 This formulation would be mathematically equivalent, but would entail a considerable amount of additional notation. Figure 3 summarizes the time line for the economy. Individuals start period t with a common (updated) prior, t . Each woman updates the common prior with her (inherited or observed) private signal and makes her work decision, generating an aggregate ! t and a noisy signal y t . Generation t+1 observes y t and uses it to update the old common prior ( t ), generating t+1 -the "culture" of generation t + 1. 25 The process continues as described in each period. It should be noted that instead of assuming women in t + 1 inherit t (or it ) which they update with the information contained in y t , we can equivalently assume that women observe the entire history of y , = 0; 1; 2:::; t: This would yield the same value of t+1 (or of it+1 ).
negative (and some greater than one) and so should be taken as an approximation for analytical simplicity. Alternatively, one can assume that the distribution is a truncated normal and allow the truncation to change with the range, for example, but this just renders the analytical expressions and computations more cumbersome. 2 4 See, for example, Chamley (1999). 2 5 Thus, we can think of generation as having a shared culture given by with the individual deviations around (given by the normal distribution of i (s)) constituting the distribution of beliefs induced by di¤erent individual's dynastic histories (i.e., by their inheritance of di¤erent realizations of s).
Some Properties of the Learning Model
In additional to generating qualitatively similar comparative statics as in the model with no learning (i.e., @!t @w f t > 0, @!t @w ht < 0), the learning model has several important properties that will prove useful in generating LFP dynamics similar to those in …gure 1.
Note …rst that beliefs in this model are unbounded. Hence, in the long run beliefs must converge to the truth. 26 Since female LFP has been increasing over time, this implies that it is likely that = L and we shall henceforth assume that this is the case.
A key characteristic of this model is that it naturally generates an S-shaped LFP curve.
To see why, note that given = L , we can rewrite (18) as
Hence, the change in the LLR is increasing in the di¤erence between the aggregate proportion of women who work when = L relative to the proportion who work when = H .
A large change in the LLR will, ceteris paribus, imply a relatively large change in the proportion of proportion of women who change their work decisions; if beliefs hardly change, there will be few women who change their work decision over time (for given wages).
To understand when the aggregate work di¤erence ! t ( L ; t ) ! t ( H ; t ) will be large or small, we can start by noting that for a given l j 2 l; l type this di¤erence is equal to:
Taking the derivative with respect to yields the f.o.c.
, (20) is minimized at s j = 1 and it is at a maximum at s j = .
Thus, if the critical signal s j ( t ) is far from in absolute value, (20) will be small. This implies that the di¤erence in the value of the aggregate signal y t ( ; ) across the two states will be swamped by the variance of the aggregate noise term t . Thus, the amount of intergenerational updating will be small and hence the change in the proportion of women who work that period, ceteris paribus, will likewise be small. This property of the normal distribution is illustrated in …gure 4 which depicts the distribution of , N 0; 2 . As can be seen in the …gure, when s is far from zero, the di¤erence in proportion of women who work in the two states is small, i.e., the di¤erence between ! j at s L and s H , (i.e., the shaded area) is small, and thus not very informative, given the noise, about the true state of nature. The opposite is true at s 0 . is close to zero, the di¤erence between ! 0 j at the two states of nature is large. Note that a similar conclusion holds once we aggregate over the l j types. Taking the derivative of (16) we obtain
Thus, if the critical signal s j ( t ) is, for the average individual in l; l , far from , (22) will be small in absolute value, intergenerational updating will be small, and the evolution of LFP over time will be slow. 27 The opposite is true when the critical signal is close to for the average individual.
It follows from the logic above that if parameter values are such that few women would choose to work if they assigned a low probability to = L ( t is low) whereas many women would choose to work if they assigned a high probability to this state ( t is high), then the amount of intergenerational learning that occurs when female LFP is either very low or very high will be relatively small as the average woman requires a very low realization of s to convince her to work in the …rst case, and a very high realization of s to convince her not to work in the second case. In both of these cases, the aggregate noise term dominates in (18) and hence the period to period change in female LFP will be likewise small. So, in these cases learning occurs, but it takes time. When, instead, the di¤erence in the proportion of women who choose to work across states is large, i.e., when s j is close to
for l j close to 0 (see footnote 27), then observing the aggregate signal tends to be informative, intergenerational learning is rapid, and the period to period change in female LFP will be large. Putting these statements together, it is easy to see that in this model the evolution of beliefs on their own (i.e., independently of earnings dynamics) will tend to generate an S-shaped curve, with a slow evolution of female LFP at the beginning, followed by rapid increases over time, and then tapering o¤ again to small increases in female LFP until there is no more learning. At that point, any further changes in female LFP result solely from changes in earnings. 28 
Wages, Technology, and Learning
The learning model generates a novel role for changes in wages or for technological change that facilitates women's market work (e.g., the washing machine in Greenwood et al (2005) or the introduction of infant formula as in Albanesi and Olivetti (2007) ). An increase in female wages, for example, will have the traditional static e¤ect of increasing female LFP.
In this model, however, it will an additional, dynamic e¤ect; it will also a¤ect the amount of intergenerational updating that takes place, i.e., t+1 t . This occurs not because it increases the proportion of women who work, but rather because it increases s j .
If, for example, the average individual requires a very low value of the signal in order to work, the increase in s induced by an increase in women's wages will render y t more informative for the next generation. As explained in the preceding section, an increase in s for the average individual increases the di¤erence across states in the proportion of women who work (when is low) and hence increases the informativeness of the aggregate signal for the next generation. Thus, increases in female earnings or technological progress or policies that make it more attractive for women to work have a positive dynamic externality when the average woman requires a very low value of s in order to work, and have a negative dynamic externality under the opposite circumstances (i.e., when it would take a very large value of s for the average woman not to work). This gives a very di¤erent lens through which to evaluate the e¤ects of changes in earnings, technology, and policy and one of the objectives of the next section will be to ask whether this e¤ect is quantitatively important in explaining the historical evolution of female LFP.
In this section I examine the ability of the simple learning model to replicate the dynamic path of female labor force participation over the last 120 years. We start with the model with no learning which I calibrate to match three key statistics of female LFP in the year 2000. This gives one a benchmark with which to measure how much the incorporation of endogenously evolving beliefs adds to the ability of the model to replicate the data. Next, I calibrate the learning model to match four additional statistics and show that the fully calibrated model does a good job of predicting the historical LFP series. The section concludes by examining the quantitative roles of beliefs relative to wages in the evolution of female LFP and distinguishing between the static and dynamic contribution of the changes in earnings to this process.
It should be noted from the outset that the empirical analysis is not a "test" of the model.
In particular, the paper does not attempt to quantify the contributions of other potentially important factors discussed in the introduction to explain the data, except insofar as these are re ‡ected in earnings changes (e.g., as would be the case for many forms of technological change or changes in wage discrimination). On the other hand, it should be clear that some of these alternative drivers of change, while considered exogenous and "belief free" in much of the literature, also re ‡ect changed beliefs about the desirability of employing women and thus nesting these explanations is far from trivial. 29 To given an example, the pace of technological change in the household is likely to have been in ‡uenced by the perceived potential demand for these implements, which in turn is in ‡uenced by whether women are working outside the home. 30 The literature tends to ignore the e¤ect of beliefs on the demand for household technological innovation. The contribution of this section is thus to evaluate the potential ability of a simple learning model to replicate the dynamics of female LFP and to examine the quantitative role of wages and beliefs in that process, abstracting from other, possibly complementary, channels.
Calibration Strategy
In both variants of the model, married women decide whether to engage in market work.
Taken their husbands'earnings as given, they are faced with increasing their consumption with their own earnings if they choose to work or foregoing the consumption increase and not bearing the disutility of being a working woman. Thus, calibrating the models requires parameter values for the chosen analytical forms and an earnings or wage series for men and women. Since the model does not incorporate an intensive work margin, it is not clear how one should measure the opportunity cost of women's work. Given the paucity of data prior to 1940, I decided to use the (median) earnings of full time (white) men and women for which some data was available as of 1890. This choice exaggerates the earnings of working women in general, as many work less than full time. As will be clear further on, however, the main conclusions are robust to reasonable alternatives.
For earnings data prior to 1940, I rely on numbers provided in Goldin (1990) who uses a variety of sources (Economic Report of the president (1986), Current Population Reports, P-60 series, and the U.S. Census among others) to calculate earnings for men and women. 31 As Goldin does not provide data for earnings in 1880 and 1910, these are constructed using a cubic approximation with the data from 1890 -1930 (inclusive).
As of 1940, I use the 1% IPUMS samples of the U.S. Census for yearly earnings (incwage) and calculate the median earnings of white 25-44 years old men and women who were working full time (35 or more hours a week) and year round (40 or more weeks a year) and were in non-farm occupations and not in group quarters. 32 As is commonly done, observations that report weekly earnings less than a cuto¤ a cuto¤ are excluded. The latter is calculated as half the nominal minimum wage times 35 hours a week and nominal weekly wages are calculated by dividing total wage and salary income last year by weeks worked last year. 33 I use the data for white men and women. I restrict the sample to white women as black women have had a di¤erent LFP trajectory with much higher participation rates earlier on. 3 2 The sample is limited to full-time year-round workers because hourly wages are not reported. Even with this restriction, the usual issues remain (see Appendix). Furthermore, the sample could have been restricted to include only married men and women, but I chose not to do this in order to be consistent with the data from the earlier time period. 3 3 See, for example, Katz and Autor (1999) . This procedure is somewhat more problematic for the decades 1940-1960, when the federal minimum wage did not apply to all workers (prior to the 1961 amendment, it only a¤ected those involved in interstate commerce). Nonetheless, I use the same cuto¤ rule as in Goldin and Margo (1992) as a way to eliminate unreasonably low wages. Note that by calculating median earnings, I do not have to concern myself with top-coding in the Census. 3 4 Goldin's 1950 number is from the Current Population Reports, series P-60 number 41 (January 1962). It is for all men over 14 which may explain the discrepancy since our census …gure leaves out men older than 44 who would, on average, have higher earnings. To calculate the probability that a woman worked in 1980 conditional on her mother's work behavior, I use the General Social Survey (GSS) from 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, and 1983 . 37 The sample includes all white married women between the ages 25-45 who were 3 5 They impute wages for non-working wives using a sample of women who worked less than 20 weeks per year, controlling for age, education, race and region, and a metropolitian area indicator (page 42). They run a probit on work (positive hours) including log hourly wages (own and husband's), non-wage income, along with the variables used to impute wages, both including and excluding education. The sample is restricted to married women 25-54 years old (with spouses in the same age range). 3 6 Using the elasticities estimated from a speci…caiton with education controls does not a¤ect the results as the elasticities are very similar (0.28 and -0.12 for 2000 and -.15 in 1990). 3 7 We used the ratio of the conditional probabilities rather than a conditional probability on its own since the latter is not consistent with the proportion of women who worked the previous generation. This is due to the fact that women in the GSS are more likely to report that their mother worked (given our lenient born in the U.S. 38 The GSS asked a variety of questions regarding the work behavior of the respondent's mother. I used the response to the question "Did your mother ever work for pay for as long as a year, after she was married?" (MAWORK) to indicate whether a woman's mother worked. For each sample year, I calculated the ratio of the probability of a woman working (i.e., she reported being in the labor force) given that her mother worked relative to the probability of her working given that her mother didn't work (henceforth referred to as the work risk ratio). I averaged this ratio across the years in the sample to obtain an average risk ratio of 1.13, i.e., women whose mother worked are 13% more likely to work in 1980 than women whose mother didn't work. In the calibration each period is a decade and, for the purpose of computing the work risk ratio, daughters will make their work decisions two periods after their mothers (i.e., a separation of 20 years).
Calibrating the Model Without Learning
We start out by calibrating the model without learning (which will also be referred to as the "earnings only" model). In that model, only changes in earnings (male and female) can explain why labor supply changed over time. The unknown parameters are ; ; and l .
As there is no direct evidence as these parameters, we calibrate them so that they are able to reproduce female LFP, a woman's own-wage elasticity, and her cross-wage (husband's wage) elasticity, all in the year 2000. These are useful statistics for the model to match as the ratio of the elasticities gives information about the curvature of the utility function and an elasticity and LFP value combined give information both about the magnitude of the common disutility of working, , and about how dispersed the l types must be in order to generate a response to a change in wages. The simplicity of the model allows one to solve for the parameter values analytically.
Note that the wage elasticity " (own, f , or cross, h) is given by:
Taking the ratio of the two elasticities and manipulating the expression yields a closed-form expression for , from which one can obtain a parameter value by using the earnings and elasticity numbers in 2000, i.e., = log 1
Next one can use one of the elasticity expressions and the requirement that G (l ; l ) = ! in 2000 to solve for and l . Note that since G is a normal distribution, one can write:
work requirement) than what would be consistent with the Census numbers. 3 8 Women who were students or retired were not included. share of husband's earnings in the past than in the present in order to explain why they worked so much less then. Since women's earnings relative to men's are higher now than in the past, most reasonable bargaining models would predict the opposite, i.e., a greater ability to obtain a higher share of male earnings now than in the past. 40 The results are also robust to the exact choice of earnings series. One might argue that, over time, the average hours worked by women has changed and this intensive margin is not incorporated into the model. In order to more fully account for this margin, rather than 
Calibrating the Learning Model
We now turn to calibrating the learning model. As LFP has been increasing throughout and, from the results of the previous section we know that changes in wages alone are unlikely to explain this phenomenon, I assume that the true state of nature is given by = L . In this case, learning over time about the true cost of working would, ceteris paribus, increase female LFP.
There is an additional complication in calibrating this model that was not present in the earnings only model -the presence of an aggregate observation shock in each period (i.e., individuals observe a noisy public signal of aggregate female LFP). This implies that the path taken by the economy depends on the realization of this shock. Each realization t generates a corresponding di¤erent public belief t+1 in the following period, and consequently a di¤erent proportion of women who choose to work after receiving their private signals. Note that we cannot simply evaluate the model at the mean of the expected shocks (i.e., at zero) since, although t+1 is linear in , the work outcomes ! t+1 are not.
I deal with the aggregate shock in the following way. For each period t + 1, given LFP in the previous period ! t , I calculate the proportion of women who would work, ! t+1 , for each possible realization of the shock, t , i.e., for each induced belief t+1 ( t ). Integrating over the shocks, I …nd the expected value of LFP for that period, E t ! t+1 ( t+1 ( t )), and then back out the particular public belief (or shock) that would lead to exactly that same proportion of women working, i.e., I solve for t+1 ( t 1 ) such that: 41
Performing this exercise in each period determines the path of beliefs. 42 Continuing with the calibration, after some algebra and noting that
one can show that the ratio of the elasticities in this model can be written as
Noting further that
, this implies that by performing the same manipulations as in the previous section one obtains (24) , and thus the same value of as in the earnings 4 1 For the computation, I take a large number of draws of entire histories for (500 histories) in order to calculate the expected value of !. See the Appendix for details. 4 2 An alternative derivation can be obtained by modeling the economy as populated by a large number (or continuum) of communities k, each of which observes y t;k = !t + t;k where is an iid draw from the normal distribution N 0;
2 . Given a common prior, t (and the same distribution of individual signals as before), the proportion of individuals that work in period t + 1 is obtained by integrating over the t;k . Thus, as before the aggregate labor force is given by equation (26), i.e., R k !t+1 t+1;k t;k = !t+1 ( t+1 ( t )). To maintain the common prior assumption,one would need to assume that in each period communities inherit the common "average" prior of the previous generation consistent with the aggregate work decision, i.e., generation t + 1 would inherit the average cultural belief t+1 ( t ). shows the evolution of the expected value of female LFP and the (red) dashed line(labeled P ) shows the evolution of public beliefs, i.e., the belief, p t t 1 , that the true state is L in period t (derived from t ). As can be seen from …gure 8, what we henceforth denote the "partially calibrated model" does an excellent job of replicating the LFP time series. We now return to the full calibration exercise in order to impose more discipline on the free parameters of the model. Parameter values are chosen such that, in addition to being In order to calculate a daughter's conditional probability of working (as a function of her mother's work behavior), we need to specify an inherited characteristic; otherwise, the conditional probability of working is the same as the non-conditional probability, which is not true in the data. In the learning model, either the private information (the signal) or the l j type could be inherited. We assume that the signal is perfectly inherited whereas the l j type is a random draw from the normal distribution G ( ) that is iid across generations. 43 Thus, given a signal s we can de…ne l s as the l j type that is just indi¤erent between working and not at that signal value (i.e., s ls = s). Hence, the probability that a woman with signal s works is G (l s ), i.e., it is the probability that her l type is smaller than l s .
Rearranging the expression for s j in (14), we obtain
And, using Bayes rule and = L , we can calculate the probability that a daughter works
given that her mother worked as:
where DW and M W stand for daughter works and mother worked, respectively. We use the predicted LFP from two periods earlier to calculate the probability that mothers worked (hence the t 2 in expressions such as G(l s;t 2 )). Note that in (28), the probability that both mother and daughter worked, Pr(DW t and M W t 2 js), is multiplied by f (s L ) as this is the proportion of daughters (or mothers) who have a private signal s in any time period.
A similar calculation to the one above yields
where M N W denotes a mother who did not work. The work risk ratio is thus given by
The results of the fully calibrated model are shown in …gure 9; table 1 reports the parameter values and calibration targets. As in …gure 8, the (blue) solid line shows the evolution of the expected value of female LFP and the (red) dashed line shows the evolution of the probability that the true state is L . See table 1 for a comparison of the calibration targets and the model's predicted values.
The calibrated model does a good job of replicating the historical path of female LFP. 44 It under-predicts LFP from 1940 to 1970, however, and slightly over predicts it from 1880 to 1900. Individuals start out in 1880 with pessimistic beliefs about how costly it is to work.
They assign around a 6% probability to the event = L (i.e., 0 implies p 0 = 0:06).
Beliefs evolves very slowly over the …rst seventy years or so (remaining no higher than 10% 4 4 The sum of squared errors (between actual and model predicted LFP) is 0.052. Individual beliefs are very dispersed as the private signal is very noisy. Figure 10 shows the path of beliefs once again, but this time for the individual with the median or mean LLR, it (s), as well as for the individuals with signals two standard deviations below and above this mean. 45 The fact that the model's predictions are too low in the period 1940-1970 may indicate that another factor, such as technological change in the household, was also responsible for the higher levels of LFP during this period. Note that a characteristic of the learning model is that any technological change that occurred in the 1930s and 1940s (e.g., the clothes washer and other housework savings devices discussed in Greenwood et al (2005)) would have had repercussions in later decades through the dynamic impact of technological change on learning discussed earlier. Alternatively, it may be that world war II made women more willing to work and that this in turn increased the pace of intergenerational learning.
It is of interest to examine the pattern of own and cross wage elasticities predicted by the model. As has been long noted, a model that generates a constant wage elasticity is at odds with the data (see, e.g., Goldin (1990) . Both the earnings only model and the learning 4 5 Using (8), note that the median individual has a LLR given by t + The learning model's elasticities predictions are shown in …gure 11. Recall that the model is calibrated to match both elasticities in 2000 and the cross elasticity in 1990. As can be seen from the picture, over time both elasticities are …rst increasing (in absolute value) and then decreasing. 46 This pattern is similar to the historical one reported in Goldin (1990) with respect to women's own wage elasticity. One can speculate that it re ‡ects, in the early decades, the unwillingness of women to work unless required to by a husband's low income. Over time, however, women become less pessimistic about the disutility of working and thus exhibit more sensitivity to their own (and husband's) wages until, further on in the process, by the 1960s, there is a much more widespread belief that it is not bad for a woman to work (recall that we …nd that indeed L is very close to zero) and there is a large drop with respect to the sensitivity to both her own and her husband's wages. 47 A comparison of the earnings only model with the learning model is instructive. Why do they obtain such di¤erent LFP paths? As noted previously, the calibration implies that both models must have the same value of . Furthermore, the di¤erence in the standard Another interesting di¤erence between the two models is with respect to their predicted elasticities'paths. As just discussed, the learning model predicts large changes in elasticities over time. This is mostly generated by changes in beliefs. The earnings only model, on the other hand, while it does predict non-constant elasticity paths, generates much smaller changes over time as can be seen in …gure 12.
It may be also be instructive to examine where the calibrated model does worse than the partially calibrated one. As can be seen from …gures 8 and 9, the main decades in which the partially calibrated model does signi…cantly better are 1950-1970. The requirement that in the fully calibrated model the parameters be able to match the work risk ratio appears to be mostly responsible for this. In the partially calibrated model, this ratio is quite a bit 
The Roles of Wages and Beliefs
To investigate the roles of changes in earnings and in beliefs, we can start by not allowing public beliefs to evolve (i.e., the public signal is shut down). measures the static contribution of wages to the evolution of LFP (as beliefs change over time in the same way for both curves whereas earnings change only in LF P (p 1880 ; w)).
Lastly, we allow wages to also in ‡uence intergenerational learning and thus beliefs and denote the LFP path obtained this way LF P (p; w)). Note that this LFP path is the one predicted by the model and depicted previously in …gure 9. It is the top (blue) curve shown in …gure 14. The di¤erence between LF P (p; w) and LF P (p 1880 ; w) measures the dynamic contribution of wages to changing LFP obtained by changing beliefs (i.e., both series have the same historical earnings series, w, but LF P (p; w) allows beliefs to respond to these changes and thus a¤ect LFP whereas LF P (p 1880 ; w) keeps the belief path that would have occurred had wages remained at their 1880 level). As can be seen in …gure 14, for the …rst several decades the static e¤ect of wages is mostly responsible for the (small) increase in LFP. Over time, both the dynamic e¤ect of wages on beliefs and the evolution of beliefs independently of wage changes become increasingly important, with the dynamic e¤ect of wages accounting for over 50% of the change in LFP between 1970 to 1990, which are decades of large LFP increases.
To understand why the dynamic e¤ect of wages is more important in some decades than others, it is useful to compare the two belief paths, p and p 1880 , depicted in …gure 15. Note that the di¤erence in the probability assigned to = L is especially large in 1980 and 1990; these probabilities would have been 22.9 and 38.7 if earnings had not changed rather than 77.0% and 89.5% respectively. By 2000, however, the di¤erence in probability assigned by the two belief paths diminishes considerably, which explains the decreased importance of the dynamic e¤ect of earnings on beliefs.
The decomposition of LFP is not unique. One could alternatively eliminate the LF P (p 1880 ; w) curve and replace it with the LFP path that would result if the beliefs followed the ones obtained from the historical earnings series, p, but wages were kept constant at their 1880 levels. This curve is shown in …gure 16 as LF P (p; w 1880 ). The e¤ect on LFP of beliefs with unchanged earnings (LF P (p 1880 ; w 1880 )) remains as before, but the dynamic e¤ect of wages is now given by the di¤erence between LF P (p; w 1880 ) and LF P (p 1880 ; w 1880 ).
These paths are obtained from the same constant 1980 earnings, w 1880 , but in the …rst trajectory beliefs evolve as they would with the historical earnings pro…le, whereas in p 1880
beliefs follow the path they would have taken had wages not changed over time. The static e¤ect of earnings is now measured as the di¤erence between LF P (p; w 1880 ) and LF P (p; w), as beliefs evolve the same way for both series whereas earnings follow di¤erent paths.
With this alternative decomposition we obtain the same basic pattern as the one described above, with both the static and dynamic e¤ect of wages becoming increasingly important over time, and with the dynamic e¤ect accounting for between 40% to 60% of LFP in the decades . Thus, the way in which we decompose the wage e¤ect into static and dynamic matters, but the basic conclusion remains the same as above.
We conclude from our decomposition of LFP that in some decades the dynamics of learning as induced by higher earnings was critical to the increases in female LFP. Overall, at di¤erent time periods, all three factors played important roles in the changes in female LFP. The model also indicates a novel role for increases in women's wages (or for technological change), beyond the traditional direct e¤ect of making it more attractive for women to work outside the home. In particular, when beliefs are relatively pessimistic, increases in women's wages make the private information (signal) required by the average woman in order to work less extreme, and thus render the public signal more informative. Thus, factors that make working more attractive when women are, on average, pessimistic, have an additional dynamic impact though the increased intergenerational updating of beliefs.
Discussion and Conclusion
Analysis of the calibrated model indicates that the dynamic e¤ect of wages on beliefs played a quantitatively important role in changing female LFP, particularly over the period .
The model makes some heroic simplifying assumptions, including an unchanged true (psychic) cost of working over 120 years. It would not be di¢ cult to incorporate changes in the cost structure, but without direct empirical evidence it seemed better to leave it constant and not introduce additional parameters. The model also ignored costs that are endogenous in nature. In particular, by modeling changes in culture arising solely as a process of learning about exogenous costs, it neglected the endogenous, socially imposed, costs stemming from social (cultural) reactions to married women in the work force.
Questions of identity (as emphasized in the economics literature by Akerlof and Kranton (2000)), and society's reactions to and portrayals of working women, most likely also played an important role in determining the path of female LFP, as might have changes in vested economic interests. Other assumptions in the model, such as the normal distributions of the noise terms, could easily be replaced with others (e.g., single-peaked distributions and relatively thin tails on both sides of the modal frequency) that would preserve the same qualitative features, particularly the S-shaped curve.
The calibrated model …nds that at the outset women were very pessimistic about the true cost of working. This lack of neutrality may indicate that particular social forces were at play in determining culture. Common economic interests for certain groups in industrial societies at that time (e.g., men?), may help explain why most countries shared the view that women working outside the home was harmful. Endogenizing this initial prior, however, is outside the model presented here and would require, in my opinion, a political economy framework to explain why certain opinions become dominant. 51 In future work, therefore, in addition to exploring the informational role of di¤erent social networks, it would also be of interest to incorporate the contribution that social rewards and punishments may play in changing behavior over time and to …nd a way to quantify their importance relative to learning. 52 Some interesting initial work in this area has been done by Munshi and Myaux (2006) who incorporate strategic interactions in the context of a learning model with multiple equilibria in which individuals are deciding whether to adopt modern contraception. 53 In future research, it would be interesting to explore also the potential ine¢ ciencies that arise because individuals do not take into account the e¤ect of their actions on learning and to examine the role that policy could play. At the empirical level, it is important to depart from focussing exclusively on aggregate features of the data over a very long time horizon.
In particular, sharper hypotheses about cultural change over a shorter time period would allow a greater use of microdata and permit one to learn more about the process of cultural di¤usion. 54 Lastly, if one could reliably identify variation in policies or technologies across otherwise similar economic space, this could allow us to empirically quantify the dynamic e¤ect of these on beliefs. Examining variation across states in the importance of WWII shocks may permit some progress in this direction. 5 1 As the economy changed, so may have the interests of …rms (capitalists) and perhaps men in general with respect to having women in the work force. For economic theories of changes in women's conditions (e.g. voting) see, for example, Doepke and Tertilt (2007) and Edlund and Pande (2002) . 5 2 The interaction of social networks and endogenous punishments is the topic explored in Fernández and Potamites (2007) . 5 3 In their model, the payo¤ in a period to an individual using birth control depends on her type (whether she is a "reformer" or not) and the contraceptive choice of the woman she interacts with in that period (this is a model with random matching). Thus, there is a strategic aspect to a woman's choice as her payo¤ depends upon the choice of the woman she meets. The authors show that if society starts in an equilibrium with no modern contraceptive use, whether it can transit to an equilibrium with contraceptive use will depend upon the proportion of individuals who are reformers, a constant fraction of which are assumed to use (for exogenous reasons) modern contraception every period. Reformers preferences are such that they obtain a higher payo¤ from using modern contraception. 5 4 Munshi and Myaux test their hypothesis, for example, using microdata from a 10 year interval in Bangladeshi villages. Bandiera and Rasul (2006) and Conley and Udry (2003) use self-reported data on social contacts to construct networks to test their models of learning about new technologies. Mira (2005) structurally estimates his model using Malaysian panel data.
Appendix

Data
To construct the earnings sample from 1940 onwards we used the 1% IPUMS samples of the U.S. Census. We limited the sample to full-time year-round workers because hourly wages are not reported. Even with this restriction, there are some issues as has been noted by all who use this data. In particular, individuals report earnings from the previous year, weeks worked last year, and hours worked last week. We included earnings from those individuals who worked 35 or more hours last week and 40 or more weeks last year. From 1980 onwards, individuals are asked to report the "usual hours worked in a week last year."
Hence for these years we require that people answer 35 or more hours to that question and we drop the restriction on hours worked last week. In 1960 and 1970, the weeks and hours worked information was reported in intervals. We take the midpoint of each interval for those years. we use the midpoint between 1880 and 1900. 55 We restricted our sample to married white women (with spouse present), born in the US, between the ages of 25 and 44 who report being in the labor force (non-farm occupations and non-group quarters).
Calibration of the learning model
In order to estimate 0 ; ; , H ; L ; and l we minimized the sum of the squared errors between the predicted and actual values of our calibration targets (see table 1 ). All statistics were weighted equally. A period is 10 years. 500 di¤erent public shocks were generated for each period (these draws were held constant throughout the minimization process). For each shock, there is a corresponding public belief that subjects begin the next period with. For each belief, a di¤erent percentage of women will choose to work after they receive their private signals.
300 discrete types were assumed between l(w h ; w f ) and l(w h ; w f ) in each year to approximate the integral in equation 16. Then we average over the shocks to determine the expected number of women working. We then back out the belief that would lead to exactly that many women working. This determines the path of beliefs. 5 5 The individual census data is missing for this year.
The elasticities were calculated computationally by assuming either a 1% increase in female earnings or male earnings and calculating the corresponding changes in LFP predicted by the model in those histories in which the (original) predicted LFP was close to the true LFP value (speci…cally those histories in which the predicted LFP was within .05 of the true LFP that year). These elasticities were calculated individually for all histories meeting this criterion and were then averaged.
In order to approximate the integrals that are needed to compute Pr(DW t jM W t 2 ) and Pr(DW t jM N W t 2 ), 400 discrete signals from L 4 to L + 4 were used.
Lastly, in the partial calibration of the learning model to the same three statistics as in the earnings only model, we estimated 0 ; ; , H ; L ; and l by minimizing the sum of the squared errors between predicted and actual LFP (12 observations).
